DRN-6291846

The complaint Mrs R’s complaint is, in essence, that Clydesdale Financial Services Limited, trading as Barclays Partner Finance, (the ‘Lender’) acted unfairly and unreasonably by (1) being party to an unfair credit relationship with her under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (the ‘CCA’) and (2) deciding against paying her claim under Section 75 of the CCA. What happened Mrs R purchased a membership of a fractional timeshare from a timeshare provider (the ‘Supplier’) on 26 July 2008 (the ‘Time of Sale’) at a cost of £23,950 (the ‘Purchase Agreement’) for a number of weeks per year at specific property (the ‘Allocated Property’) named on her purchase agreement for 16 years. Mrs R paid for this membership taking finance of £23,950 from the Lender (the ‘Credit Agreement’). Mrs R – using a professional representative (the ‘PR’) – wrote to the Lender (dated 23 October 2023) and said that Mrs R had lost out and wished to make a claim under S140 CCA and under S75 of the CCA against the Lender. On 08 February 2025, the Lender issued their final response letter on the matter pointing to time limits and lack of evidence as to why this complaint should not be upheld against it. The Lender says on 10 July 2025 the fractional timeshare membership came to an end and Mrs R was paid £14,784.31 for her fractional timeshare. On 02 October 2025 Mrs R’s complaint was assessed by an Investigator who, having considered the information on file thought the S75 claim on the sale was fairly declined under the Limitation Act 1980 and that the S140A claim should not be upheld. The PR on behalf of Mrs R asked for an Ombudsman’s decision – which is why it was passed to me. I issued a provisional decision dated 18 March 2026 which stated the following (in italics and smaller font for clarity): I have considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. And having done that, I do not currently think this complaint should be upheld. Firstly I should make very clear (my emphasis) that in terms of the regulatory context that applies here as this purchase was in July 2008 neither The Timeshare, Holiday Products, Resale and Exchange Contracts Regulations 2010 (the ‘Timeshare Regulations’) nor the Resort Development Organisation’s Code of Conduct dated 1 January 2010 (the ‘RDO Code’) apply to this purchase as the sale predate these coming into force. As neither of these were retrospective, I find that this sale of this membership cannot be in contravention of them. As such I see nothing to be gained by considering the PR’s

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numerous arguments referencing these regulations and code as they simply did not apply at the time of sale. Accordingly much of the PR’s arguments along these lines have been a waste of time and ink. The S75 claim Within the letter of claim the PR made a claim on Mrs R’s behalf under S75 of the CCA. These include allegations of misrepresentation during the sales process and submissions in support of those allegations. This membership was purchased on 26 July 2008 by Mrs R and the Lender in its final response points to time limits being applicable. The CCA introduced a regime of connected lender liability under section 75 that affords consumers (“debtors”) a right of recourse against lenders that provide the finance for the acquisition of goods or services from third-party merchants (“suppliers”) in the event that there is an actionable misrepresentation and/or breach of contract by the supplier. In short, a claim against The Lender under section 75 essentially mirrors the claim Mrs R could make against the Supplier. Under section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980, Mrs R had to make any claim within six years of when such misrepresentations are said to have happened or when alleged breaches of contract occurred because those are the points from which she would have lost out. As she didn’t make her S75 claim until 2023 it is clear to me that the Lender could rely on the Limitation Act as a complete defence from any claim with regard to misrepresentations at the point of sale as they were out of time. With regard to breaches of contract the same six years applies from when the breach has said to occurred. The Lender points to evidence of Mrs R receiving the funds at the end of her membership term (July 2025) and I’ve seen no persuasive evidence that this payment wasn’t in line with the contract. Furthermore I’ve seen evidence of Mrs R using the membership throughout the term of the contract. Mrs R says in her submissions that they could not holiday where and when they wanted to – which, on my reading of the complaint, suggests that they consider that the Supplier was not living up to its end of the bargain, and had breached the Purchase Agreement. Like any holiday accommodation, availability was not unlimited – given the higher demand at peak times, like school holidays, for instance. Some of the sales paperwork in such sales states that the availability of holidays was/is subject to demand. I accept that they may not have been able to take certain holidays. But I have not seen enough to persuade me that the Supplier had breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement. So I’m not persuaded there’s any breach either. Accordingly I’m not persuaded Mrs R has lost out due to how the Lender considered her S75 claim. The S140 claim Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs R and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. I should reiterate that at this time neither The Timeshare, Holiday Products, Resale and Exchange Contracts Regulations 2010 (the ‘Timeshare Regulations’) nor the Resort Development Organisation’s Code of Conduct dated 1 January 2010 (the ‘RDO Code’) apply as the sale predate these coming into force. Accordingly I’ll not address the arguments the PR makes about these regulations and codes applying here as they clearly didn’t. Having considered the entirety of the credit relationship between Mrs R and the Lender along with all of the circumstances of the complaint, I don’t think the credit relationship between them was likely to have been rendered unfair for the purposes of Section 140A. When coming to that conclusion, and in carrying out my analysis, I have looked at: 1. The standard of the Supplier’s commercial conduct – which includes its sales and marketing practices at the Time of Sale along with any relevant training material; 2. The provision of information by the Supplier at the Time of Sale, including the contractual documentation and disclaimers made by the Supplier;

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3. The commission arrangements between the Lender and the Supplier at the Time of Sale and the disclosure of those arrangements; 4. Evidence provided by both parties on what was likely to have been said and/or done at the Time of Sale; 5. The inherent probabilities of the sale given its circumstances; and, when relevant 6. Any existing unfairness from a related credit agreement. I should also add that the relevant case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant. The PR has provided swathes of generic information in relation to this supplier, much of which refers to much more recent events. I’ve considered all of this. However I’ve given weight to the evidence from the time of sale and what the parties have said happened in Mrs R’s case. For the generic submissions made which don’t relate directly to this credit relationship I’ve given it less weighting in my thinking. Mrs R and the PR give very little description of what happened at this point of sale nor explain how that’s led to Mrs R losing out. It is also important to remember that although the Lender has to treat claims to it fairly there is a need for claims to be made out properly as they would have to be as they would against the supplier directly. From what I’ve seen here I’m not persuaded that there are any actionable misrepresentations or breaches of contract here which would render the relationship unfair in the round. The PR says there was one or more unfair contract terms in the Purchase Agreement and that makes the credit relationship unfair. However, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that issues such as regulatory breaches do not automatically create unfairness for the purposes of that provision. Such breaches and their consequences (if there are any) must be considered in the round, rather than in a narrow or technical way. And in any case, I can’t see that any such terms were operated unfairly against Mrs R in practice, nor that any such terms led her to behave in a certain way to her detriment. And with that being the case, I’m not persuaded that any of the terms governing this timeshare membership are likely to have led to an unfairness that warrants a remedy. The PR also says that Mrs R was not given sufficient information at the Time of Sale by the Supplier about the ongoing costs of this membership. The PR also says that the contractual terms governing the ongoing costs of membership and the consequences of not meeting those costs were unfair contract terms. As I have already indicated, the case law on Section 140A makes it clear that it does not automatically follow that regulatory breaches create unfairness for the purposes of the unfair relationship provisions. The extent to which such mistakes render a credit relationship unfair must also be determined according to their impact on the complainant. And I should also add that it is incumbent on the claimant to make out the facts of their claim and the Lender to then consider it as it should. A lot of the PR’s arguments here do not support Mrs R’s claim either through trying to apply regulations which didn’t exist at the time or providing arguments which are not pertinent to Mrs R’s case. I appreciate that a lot of time has passed since this purchase and memories fade and direct evidence may no longer be available, but it remains the case that the claimant has to make out the facts of their claim. I acknowledge that it is also possible that the Supplier did not give Mrs R sufficient information, in good time, on the various charges they could have been subject to as timeshare members. But even if that was the case, I cannot see that the ongoing costs of membership were applied unfairly in practice. And as neither Mrs R nor the PR have persuaded me that they would not have pressed ahead with their purchase had the finer details of the memberships ongoing costs been disclosed by the Supplier, I cannot see why any failings in that regard are likely to be material to the outcome of this complaint given its fact and circumstances. So in the round I’m not persuaded that Mrs R has shown how the relationship was unfair and accordingly I’m not persuaded that the Lender has treated her unfairly by not paying her claim.

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The PR points to a decision taken by the Advertising Standards Authority in 2024. From what I’ve seen this doesn’t make any findings about the Supplier with regard to their advertising in 2008. So I don’t think its persuasive with regard to what the Supplier was doing in 2008. And I should note that the Lender is correct in pointing out that in the claim made to it there wasn’t any persuasive testimony from Mrs R about the sale in 2008. Latterly the PR has said “Our clients were bombarded from dawn until dusk” and “at the airport they followed our clients to the airport and were still trying to get them to sign as they flew out of Lanzarote” and “our clients were physically locked in the presentation room, so our clients were unable to get out of the room, these are the lengths they were going to and the high-level pressure which was being applied to get them to agree to sign.” However in the letter of claim of October 2023 none of these allegations were made. I find it unlikely that such matters couldn’t be remembered in 2023 but are now remembered in 2025. Furthermore these allegations don’t sit well with the copies of email correspondence between the parties over many years which make no reference to such instances and are what I’d characterise as in a friendly tone between the parties. And had Mrs R been treated as suggested its not clear to me how there was a working relationship between the parties from 2008 until the end of the membership term in 2025. The PR repeatedly says that this membership was sold as an investment. In 2008 there was no regulation in place stating that timeshare couldn’t be sold or marketed as an investment nor was there any prohibition on it being an investment (which this clearly was). And as the Lender points out, Mrs R received a significant return on her investment in July 2025. So I’m far from persuaded that this caused an unfair relationship between Mrs R and the Lender. The PR says the Supplier gave retirement advice to Mrs R. I’ve seen no persuasive evidence of this in the documentation or indeed the letter of claim. I can see evidence of the timeshare being sold to them and Mrs R receiving a return on the membership alongside regular utilisation of the membership throughout the term of the membership. I’ve not seen persuasive evidence of an unfair relationship between Mrs R and the Lender. I appreciate that the PR points to other cases where consumers have had issues with this supplier. However the matter at hand here is whether the Lender has considered Mrs R’s claims to it unfairly. And I’m far from persuaded that it as nor that Mrs R has lost out here. I didn’t find any of the arguments put forward demonstrated that the credit agreement between Mrs R and the Lender was unfair to her under section 140A of the CCA. Absent any other reason why it would be fair or reasonable to direct the Lender to compensate Mrs R, I said I didn’t propose to uphold the complaint. Responses to my provisional findings The Lender accepted my provisional decision. The PR didn’t accept the proposed outcome. It made further submissions in support of Mrs R’s position. Having received and reviewed these, I’m now proceeding with my final decision. In doing so, I’m conscious that the PR has made a series of assertions surrounding the provision of information. These include, among other things, expressing doubt that the Lender has provided key information, requesting that the information we have received be shared with it in full, and asking that we do not proceed with a decision before this is done and it has had an opportunity to make further submissions. The PR’s requests have been addressed by us under separate correspondence. For reasons I will explain in the course of this decision, I’ve concluded that it’s appropriate for me to proceed with my determination. The legal and regulatory context In considering what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the complaint, I am required under DISP 3.6.4R to take into account: relevant (i) law and regulations; (ii)

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regulators’ rules, guidance and standards; and (iii) codes of practice; and (where appropriate), what I consider to have been good industry practice at the relevant time. The legal and regulatory context that I think is relevant to this complaint is no different to that shared in several hundred ombudsman decisions on very similar complaints albeit that this purchase was in 2008 which predates some of the regulation in similar, later, cases. What I’ve decided – and why I’ve considered all the available evidence and arguments to decide what’s fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this complaint. After considering the case afresh and having regard for what’s been said in response to my provisional decision, I find it offers no persuasive reason to depart from the conclusions I’ve previously set out. The PR provides no persuasive new evidence or comment from Mrs R. It simply makes what I consider to be a number of unsupported and unsubstantiated arguments about the provisional decision issued. So in order to avoid repetition I’m only going to deal with the key arguments the PR has made in response to my provisional decision as I see them (and in the order that they were made). The PR has, unusually, argued that this membership wasn’t an investment. It says this despite saying in its letter of claim “The Supplier did not provide Our Clients with key information that was material to understanding the investment element of the membership, the ongoing costs of the membership, and the availability of holidays” and a number of similar comments about the investment nature of the membership. The paperwork from the sale that the PR has provided from the Supplier refers to it as an “investment” and it was marketed as a membership in which was purchased at a significant cost, provided benefits and at the end there would be some form of return (which was paid in this case). By reference to the decided authorities (of which the PR is well aware), an investment is a transaction in which money or other property is laid out in the expectation or hope of financial gain or profit. So I’m satisfied it was an investment. The PR says “The conclusion that the Section 75 claim is time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980 does not reflect the approach taken under DISP.” It’s this service’s role to consider the complaint by Mrs R about the outcome of Mrs R’s Section 75 claim to the Lender. The Lender relied on time limits in its defence to the claim. It was fair for it to do so because the time limits applied. The PR says “The payment received at the end of the term does not cure the underlying unfairness.” On the balance of probabilities for all the reasons given I’m not persuaded there was any unfairness in the relationship between Mrs R and the Lender. The PR says this decision is inconsistent with other decisions from this service. Firstly cases at this service are decided on their individual merits, including this case. Many other cases involving such memberships have been upheld where the evidence in those cases supports that conclusion. The PR has fallen significantly short of evidencing any unfairness here. In summary, for the reasons given, I see no persuasive reason to uphold this complaint about the Lender as I’m not persuaded Mrs R has been treated unfairly. My final decision It is my final decision not to uphold this complaint. Under the rules of the Financial Ombudsman Service, I’m required to ask Mrs R to accept or

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reject my decision before 13 May 2026. Rod Glyn-Thomas Ombudsman

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